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ABSTRACT 
 The extended mind debate juggles the possibilities of whether or not the 
mind extends out into the world. Today, with the rise in technology, we have an 
additional claim that our tools are responsible for extending our minds. The 
internet,  smart phones, and other tools give us a foothold in the extended mind 
debate by providing real world examples of how our mind is perceived as 
extending out into the world. In discovering where the divide between mind and 
environment exists we can come up with a conclusion whether or not the mind 
truly extends out into the world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 When we imagine the possibilities of the extended mind, we tend to 
wander off to thoughts of telekinesis, mind control,  or telepathy. If asked 
whether the ability to move things with your mind constitutes your mind 
extending out into the world, a majority of the people would agree that in this 
case, the mind truly does extend out into the world. However, the world today 
has given us many opportunities to extend our mind into the world. If I were to 
implant a device into my head that could turn off all  the lights in my house just 
by thinking, it  seems that my mind has the capabilities to extend beyond itself 
to affect the environment. But how different is it  to think about turning off the 
lights with your mind than having a remote control in your hand? The mind still  
has the same intent to turn off the lights in both cases, but it  is simply the 
means by which it  is accomplished that differs. This difference does not 
constitute whether the mind extends out into the world since I argue that in both 
cases, the mind is extending out into the world. Understanding where the 
boundaries of the extended mind lie will provide a better understanding as to 
what constitutes the extended mind. Alternatively, perhaps finding no 
boundaries to the extended mind will provide just as important a discovery. 
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CHAPTER 1 – WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 
 
I. THE EXTENDED MIND 
 Where is the divide between mind and the external world located? The 
question of the extended mind forces us to investigate how the mind spills out 
into the world. We are surrounded by a world where devices and electronics aid 
in our everyday tasks, making life easier. For example, today cell phones allow 
us to access a worldwide repository of information within seconds. While some 
skeptics believe that the possibility of the mind extending beyond the brain is a 
blasphemous idea, many philosophers, such as Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 
believe that the mind is not confined to such a limited reach. Essentially, the 
mind extends out into the world.  
 In our everyday world, we see the results of minds at work. That is,  
computers, cell phones, eye glasses, etc. all  have in common the fact that they 
originated from the mind. Something must first be conceived of in the mind 
before it  can manifest into the physical.  However, does this prove that minds 
extend into our world beyond the skull and skin of our bodies? This is the most 
underlying question when dealing with the case of the extended mind. The mind 
is simply defined as, “the element, part,  substance, or process that reasons, 
thinks, feels, wills,  perceives, judges, etc.”1 In our technological ripe age of 
today, we can see the possibilities that the computer is bringing us. We have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 "mind." Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc. 22 Apr. 2011. <Dictionary.com 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mind>. 
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built machines that can reason, perceive, and judge and the thought of artificial 
intelligence does not seem as “science fiction” as it  once was. The mind is 
beginning to leak out into the world and we can already see it  with the new 
“iPhones” and the ever expanding capabilities of the internet.  Computers and 
microprocessor technology are opening doors to new human biological 
interfaces that incorporate the mind directly in order to accomplish desired 
outcomes. For example, the cochlear implant is a fairly new procedure that 
brings the sense of sound to the deaf or hard of hearing. This device connects 
directly to the nerves associated with hearing and, in a sense, bypasses the ear 
to alternatively bring electronic impulses to the nerves. This cochlear implant, 
also termed the “bionic ear”, shows how our tools help us to better extend our 
minds. However, the extended mind does not need to have a microprocessor chip 
within it  to be considered an extended mind; rather it  must simply interface 
between our mind and the environment. 
 Allow me to sway your beliefs that mind can exist as an external factor in 
your everyday lives. Imagine the processes involved in long division. Long 
division is a fairly simple operation which constitutes multiple steps in order to 
achieve a solution. This process is not something that we can easily do in our 
head. In fact,  most of us would opt for a pencil and paper in order to perform 
long division. Specifically, when we perform long division with a pencil and 
paper, we perform individual calculations which we then externalize as numbers 
and marks on paper. This allows us to abandon our newly acquired flow of 
thoughts as we only need to know them until  we move on to the next 
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calculation. These numbers and markings that we make while performing long 
division seem to be nothing more than external placeholders for the mind. That 
is,  they are an external representation of our mind. Why is it  easier to perform 
long division with a pencil and paper? It is because we allow our mind to extend 
beyond the confines of our skull and permeate into the world around us. The 
pencil and paper is a simple example of how our internal processes are indeed 
externalized when carrying out the task of long division. Clark and Chalmers 
identify this type of external association as active externalism  in which the 
environment of an individual has a potential to function as part of the mind. 
Additionally, this interaction of mind and environment proposes the idea of a 
coupled system  where the mind and external objects work in tandem to perform 
specific actions. However, in order for something external to constitute being an 
extension of the mind, the external object must function with the same purpose 
as the internal processes. Clark and Chalmers claim that,   
“[all] the components in the system play an active 
causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the 
same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we 
remove the external component the system’s behavioral 
competence will drop, just as it  would if we removed 
part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled 
process counts equally well as a cognitive process, 
whether or not it  is wholly in the head.”2 
According to Clark and Chalmers, the mind is constituted as something which 
can aid in the cognitive process, neither being exclusively in the head, nor the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58 (1998): 8-9. Oxford Journals. Web. 17 
Jan. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150>. 
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environment, but instead coupled between the two in its very own form of 
cognition. 
 Perhaps you are still  skeptical that the mind cannot be an external thing; 
that everything we perceive to be external is indeed still  only derived from the 
mind. Clark and Chalmers provide a thought experiment in which we can more 
easily imagine the case of the extended mind. Otto is an individual with 
Alzheimer’s disease who, through means of conditioning, learns to keep 
pertinent knowledge he acquires in a notebook. His notebook is filled with 
information that he uses to guide him through tasks which you and I could easily 
perform by referring to our internal memory in our mind. For example, Otto 
plans to visit  the museum, but does not remember which street the museum is 
on. Otto must resort to his notebook in order to “remember” which street the 
museum is on. In his notebook, he sees that the museum is on 53r d Street.  Otto 
must trust his notebook since he cannot discern true memories from false 
memories. That is,  whatever Otto wishes to know or remember, he writes down 
in his notebook in order to be able to refer to it  at a later time. Knowing that 
Otto can trust his “memory bank”, or notebook, Otto can now confidently head 
over to the museum on 53r d Street since his notebook stated that the museum is 
on 53r d Street.  Otto’s notebook is part of his mind. It  is an externalized bank of 
memories which functions with the same purpose as our internalized memories. 
So why can’t the notebook be considered part of Otto’s mind when it  functions 
in almost the exact same way as internal memory? This is the question that I 
raise towards skeptics. The mind can constitute a physical notion such as “brain 
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substance” or an immaterial concept that we can orchestrate through the 
manipulating of our environment. I argue that the latter is the case with the 
human mind. That is,  we manipulate external objects in order to extend the 
potential of our mind. 
 The idea of the extended mind is not limited to our conscious thinking 
abilities however; it  goes far beyond that.  For example, it  can be something 
more peripheral such as a blind person’s walking cane. That is,  we classify our 
mind’s input through the five senses; sight, touch, taste, smell,  and hearing. The 
blind person, through loss of sight, must rely on the use of the cane to navigate. 
The mind, after continuous use and familiarity, begins to welcome the cane as 
one of the senses, specifically an extension of touch. If the blind person’s cane 
is an extension of the sense of touch and the sense of touch is a means of input 
for the mind, then it  seems clear that the mind has a clear connection with the 
cane and thus becomes part of the mind. Alva Noë, author of the book, “Out of 
Our Heads” gets straight to the point when he writes, “[t]here is no reason to 
suppose that the critical boundary is found in our brains or our skin”3. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Noë, Alva. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness. New York: Hill and Wang, 2009. 67-68. Print. 
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CHAPTER 2 – CAN ANYTHING BE EXTENDED? 
 
I. CONDITIONS FOR AN EXTENDED MIND 
The most important question dealing with the extended mind involves 
determining where the limits of the extended mind lie? In order to come up with 
a set of conditions, it  would be best to come up with traits based upon things 
that we perceive as mind. Memory is inarguably part of the mind and it  presents 
us with some traits which can help us to pin down conditions for an extended 
mind. Andy Clark and David Chalmers propose several conditions in which 
something may qualify as being part of the extended mind in their article “The 
Extended Mind”. Their method of finding conditions for what constitutes an 
extended mind revolve mainly around pinning down the traits which make up 
something we would agree to be part of the mind, memory, or specifically the 
“Otto’s notebook” case which I mentioned in the previous chapter. The first 
condition Clark and Chalmers state for the extended mind is that “memory” or 
some object is “consistently and reliably available and is typically invoked”4. 
Second, “the information in x is easily accessible when it  is required”5. Third, 
the object is “automatically endorsed”6; that is,  in the same way that we come to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58 (1998): 7-19. Oxford Journals. Web. 17 
Jan. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150>. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
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accept our own memories as true and our own. Lastly, the object has been 
“consciously endorsed”7 by the individual at some point,  or in other words, the 
individual is aware of the object and its contents. Clark and Chalmers’ 
conditions cover a wide range of requisites which may constitute an extended 
mind. Although these conditions provide a detailed description of the conditions 
of the extended mind, I propose that additional conditions may be required to 
more concretely identify the extended mind.  
In an attempt to address Clark and Chalmers’ conditions for the extended 
mind, I found it  beneficial to list several traits which make memory part of the 
mind. Some of these traits involve being able to access your memory at will,  
believing information in your memory to be true, being aware of your memories, 
and being able to adapt or create new memories through new experiences. These 
traits can be universalized in a sense if we remove the aspect of memory and 
replace it  with a generic “X”. As a result,  a more formal set of conditions for 
some object X  to be a mind can be given as follows:  
1) X is easily accessible 
2) X is believed to be in alignment with one’s understanding  
3) X’s purpose is clearly understood 
4) The more experience X receives increases the ability of the individual.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
7 Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58 (1998): 7-19. Oxford Journals. Web. 17 
Jan. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150>. 
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The four conditions I mentioned above present similarities with Clark and 
Chalmers’ conditions. However, the difference between the two lies in my 
fourth condition; the more experience X receives results in an increase in the 
ability of the individual. This condition incorporates some additional aspects of 
the mind which is not present in Clark and Chalmers’. That is,  the mind is in an 
ever-changing, plastic state of adapting to new experiences. It  is this constant 
flux that allows the mind to extend into the world and to permeate our 
surroundings. This adaptability of the mind is what allows our mind to interact 
with our environment. Now if we apply this condition to the “Otto’s notebook” 
case, we can see that the contents in Otto’s notebook adapt to new information 
which Otto receives, or similarly, Otto’s ability grows with the more experience 
the notebook receives. This underlying factor of the mind’s adaptability presents 
us with an interesting idea which is not present in Clark and Chalmers’ 
conditions. To further investigate whether this adaptability condition holds true, 
we can apply it  to an array of objects which we can then determine whether it  is 
truly an extension of the mind.  
II.  ADAPTIBILITY OF THE MIND 
The first objects I would like to introduce are glasses. The case of glasses 
presents an interesting example because we are unsure of whether we can 
constitute them as being of the mind or not. That is,  they merely seem to be 
tools which alter our perception of the environment. However, imagine a cyborg 
that may contain an advanced infrared vision device. The infrared vision not 
only alters the perception of the environment for the individual, but it  expands 
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the ability of the mind to perceive new information that was never available to a 
normal human being. It  intuitively seems that the cyborg would qualify for the 
case of the extended mind. However, glasses can be perceived as a primitive 
form of infrared vision which practically has the same underlying function, 
altering the perception of the environment. The argument of infrared vision also 
holds for glasses as well.  That is,  glasses also expand the ability of the mind to 
perceive new information that is not available to certain individuals, 
specifically individuals with poor eyesight. Additionally, we can apply the 
conditions which I aforementioned to the case of glasses to determine its status 
of an extended mind. Glasses are easily accessible in that they are worn on the 
face, in front of the eyes. Second, the information presented by the glasses is 
believed to be in alignment with the individual’s understanding, or in other 
words, the individual believes the information presented by the glasses to be 
true. Third, the purpose of the glasses is understood by the individual. Lastly, 
the more an individual wears glasses, the greater the ability of the individual 
becomes. The case of glasses presents us with an example of an extended mind 
based upon the conditions presented. Moreover, I want to take this example one 
step further and suggest the idea of contact lenses. Contact lenses are a great 
example of how technology is shaping our world by incorporating tools that 
seem to disappear even while we use them. These invisible applications are 
making it  easier to claim that an extended mind exists since they work “behind 
the scenes”, similarly to how the mind perceives to work. The case of contacts 
versus glasses represents the example of how we are more able to produce 
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“tools” which can become transparent. That is,  the more transparent a tool 
becomes, the less we see the need of the individual to adapt to it .  However, it  
does not stop there. It  is easy to imagine a wide range of objects which 
subsequently fall  under the category of an extended mind. 
I would like to reintroduce the example of the pen and paper. If one were 
to test whether the conditions of the pen and paper fall under the conditions for 
the extended mind, they would find that it  indeed does. This is similar with the 
blind person’s cane, the cellphone, and an artist’s sketchpad as well.  Andy 
Clark, in his book Natural-Born Cyborgs ,  categorizes these types of objects as 
“transparent tools”8. The idea behind transparent tools involves a shift from the 
“technology-centered” products to the “human-centered” products. Clark gives 
an example of this by portraying the shift from town clock towers to common 
wristwatches. As technology advances, tools which are too big to be “easily 
accessible” start to become smaller and more personal. These shifts towards 
tools which are “transparent” in their nature allow us to develop a closer 
relationship to them, creating the possibility to extend our minds. 
Allow us to examine the case of something widely used by millions of 
people and determine whether it  constitutes an extended mind. I propose the 
case of Google Maps. Imagine you are driving along the freeway and suddenly 
you hit traffic. Since you hate sitting in traffic you decide to take out your 
phone, which has Google Maps on it ,  in order to see how much traffic there is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Clark, Andy. Natural-born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2003. 38-39. Print. 
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between you and your destination. While on Google Maps, you are notified that 
an alternate route exists which would get you around the traffic and to your 
destination faster than waiting in traffic. This account of Google Maps, which 
aids in your decision making, is a bit more difficult to pin down as being part of 
the extended mind. If we apply the conditions of an extended mind to Google 
Maps, we can see that it  is easily accessible; it  is believed to be in alignment 
with one’s understanding; its purpose is clearly understood; and the more 
experience it  receives increases the ability of the individual. That is,  Google 
Maps relies on data provided by other individuals using Google Maps in order to 
constantly keep an update on traffic speed, accidents, and so on. The more 
Google Maps is used, the greater the function it  provides.  So, Google Maps 
qualifies as being part of the extended mind.  
I claim adaptability of the mind is a big factor in the ability for the mind 
to extend out into the world. This can be seen almost every day with people that 
attend therapy sessions for prosthesis, injuries, etc. in that they must learn to 
adapt their mind to the changes they are forced to endure. For example, an 
individual who is a leg amputee becomes aware of the sudden changes in their 
ability to walk. Their mind has been so conditioned to the fact that once a leg 
used to be where there is now a prosthetic. This individual attends therapy 
sessions in order to recondition the mind in order to begin to adapt to the new 
prosthetic. We can infer that the more experience the prosthetic receives, the 
ability of the individual begins to increase. This prosthetic begins to become 
part of the individual. It  is as if the mind begins to extend itself into whatever 
13 
	  
we condition it  to become; in this case, a prosthetic leg. Once the individual 
becomes attuned to the new prosthetic leg, it  becomes second nature. However, 
this trend can be seen in more than just prosthetics. Going back to the pencil 
and paper example, we are all  aware that it  took conditioning to learn how to 
write, we see it  with all  the kindergarteners and first graders who practice their 
scribbly letters in order to perfect the skill . It  takes conditioning to adapt our 
mind to accept a new form of interacting with our environment and through this 
process we consequently extend our minds into the environment. It  is this aspect 
of adaptability that I believe Clark and Chalmers overlook into the aspect of the 
extended mind. Although their conditions present us with a way to more easily 
identify the aspects of an extended mind, there is a quality to the adaptability of 
the mind that is seen in all the examples of the extended mind. Additionally, 
with the introduction of “transparent tools” we can see that there is a slightly 
smaller margin for adaptability of the mind since it  seems to interact with our 
mind in such a fluid fashion; such as the case with contact lenses. It  doesn’t 
take much conditioning to adapt to the contact lenses since they almost instantly 
benefit the wearer. The contact lenses are a good example of how we are 
beginning to interface our own biology to make these “transparent tools” more 
easily adaptable.  
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III.  OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTENDED MIND 
As intriguing as the thought of the extended mind sounds, there exist 
those who argue against the notion of the mind extending out into the world. 
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, in their book The Bounds of Cognition ,  state that 
although a possibility such as “transcranial cognition”9 (the extended mind) may 
exist;  the cases we are presented with do not fulfill  the requirements. Adams 
and Aizawa claim that the pen and paper are merely tools which allow us to 
work around our cognitive limitations. These “cleverly designed non-cognitive 
tools”10 aid in our cognitive processes, but do not constitute being part of the 
extended mind. In their defense, Adams and Aizawa state that,  “cognitive 
processes are so different from the physical process in the tools we use that a 
science that ignores this difference essentially ignores cognition.11 The 
cognitive process is functionally different than that of tools in that the cognitive 
processes involve non-derived content whereas tools are only representations of 
derived content. Their hypothesis states that if  we are to find the bounds of 
cognition, it  must be through determining the mark of cognition. This mark of 
cognition is their basis for determining whether or not it  is possible for the mind 
to extend out into the world. That is,  they claim that the mark of cognition is 
nowhere to be found in our world other than in our very brains. Adams and 
Aizawa take a very literal approach to the idea of cognition in that it  must act in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Adams, Frederick, and Kenneth Aizawa. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. Pg 1. Print. 
 
10Ibid. 
 
11Ibid., 5. 
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the same exact way as the human mind in order to constitute being of the mind. 
I claim that cognition does not necessarily need to be similar to the cognition of 
the human mind, but rather cognition coupled with an outside factor that fulfills 
the conditions of an extended mind. Although Adams and Aizawa are correct in 
that the cognitive process is non-derived, there is an alternative view that tools 
are simply externalized ideas.  
While addressing the philosophical implication of tools, James Feibleman 
states in his article, “The Philosophy of Tools”, that “[…] it  is possible to 
measure the degree of a civilization by its proliferated use of tools […]”12. 
Viewing the question of whether the mind extends beyond the body in a wider 
view, namely civilizations, we can denote that a civilization’s development can 
be measured by their use of tools. Additionally, Feibleman states that,  “[…] 
tools are particular and concrete ideas which have been externalized and 
fixed”.13 Tools originate in the mind since they first must be conceived by the 
mind. Thus, a civilization can be measured based upon how far they have 
extended their mind into their environment. This implies that the modern day 
civilization has advanced further than any other civilization based upon our 
ability to extend our mind, or to create complex tools and this indeed seems to 
be true with the invention of the internet and cell phones. With the invention of 
different tools, we can more efficiently complete tasks at a fraction of the time. 
These advancements allow us to perform more complex tasks which could not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Feibleman, James K. "The Philosophy of Tools." Social Forces 45.3 (1967): 330. JSTORE. Web. 22 Feb. 2011. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2575191>. 
 
13 Ibid., 332. 
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have been possible without the help of tools. It  is our tools which allow us to 
expand our minds, and it  is our tools which allow us to extend our minds. 
Additionally, Clark claims that the cognitive process is indeed similar to the 
tools we use, “[if],  as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it  done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so 
we claim) part of the cognitive process.14 I will argue that the cognitive process 
of mentally performing long division in the mind is,  in a sense, different from 
the cognitive process of performing long division with a pencil and paper, but 
the outcome of this cognitive process is the intriguing part of this thought 
experiment. Imagine when you perform long division in your mind, you must be 
careful not to scramble the constantly changing numbers in your head. It  begins 
to become burdensome if you are asked to perform this process repeatedly since 
your mind has a tendency to forget some of the numbers which you store in your 
mind. Now imagine your cognitive process while performing long division with 
a pencil and paper. The cognitive process involved in long division with a 
pencil and paper is much less straining on the mind, since you do not need to 
constantly remember numbers in your mind. Ultimately, we can see that with the 
simple addition of a pencil and paper, performing long division not only reduces 
the strain on the cognitive process in the mind, but allows the process to be 
completed more quickly and more easily. Adams and Aizawa address this 
concern in their book by stating that when one uses a pencil and paper, “[…] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Analysis 58 (1998): Pg. 8. Oxford Journals. Web. 17 
Jan. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328150>. 
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one deploys a different set of cognitive capacities than that deployed in 
performing the computation in one’s head” Although they claim that the pencil 
does not denote any “mark of the cognition”, it  is easy to see that the addition 
of the pencil and paper makes a significant difference in the cognitive process 
overall.  It  is this difference that denotes something greater than the “mark of the 
cognitive”. Perhaps we are beginning to understand that the mind extends out 
into the world.  
Several philosophers apart from Clark and Chalmers, such as Daniel 
Dennett,  have taken sides against Adams and Aizawa by suggesting that the 
brain and its “paraphernalia”15 should be viewed as a single cognitive system. 
Dennett explains his views on why we humans maintain our intellectual 
superiority over animals: 
“[…] our habitat is offloading  as much as possible of 
out cognitive tasks into the environment itself –
extruding our minds (that is our mental projects and 
activities) into the surrounding world, where a host of 
peripheral devices we construct can store, process, and 
re-represent our meanings, streamlining, enhancing, 
and protecting the process of transformation that are 
our thinking. This widespread practice of offloading 
releases us from the limitations of our animal brains”16 
Dennett is proposing the idea that humanity is able to maintain our intellectual 
properties through our ability to incorporate our surroundings into our 
activities. Perhaps it  would be easier to imagine the human as a computer since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Dennett, Daniel Clement. Kinds of Minds: toward an Understanding of Consciousness. New York, NY: Basic, 
1996. 134-135. Print. 
 
16 Ibid., 44. 
18 
	  
much of what a human does is more or less synonymous with a computer. A 
computer is made up of components; much like a human is made up of different 
organs. First,  there is the hard drive which is the primary placeholder of 
memory for the computer. Much like the memory portion of the brain, the hard 
drive stores and recalls information almost constantly. The next component of 
the computer is the central processing unit,  or the CPU. The CPU is analogous 
to the cognition of the mind. It  processes information being retrieved from the 
hard drive and rewrites new information, constantly updating its current state to 
perform the requested tasks. With the recent advances in computer technology, 
computers have incorporated a system which makes it  possible to process 
multiple tasks at once by incorporating additional “cores” to the CPU. However, 
the single core CPU best models the human brain and will be what I focus on for 
this thought experiment. This single core CPU can only process one task at a 
time by referring to its RAM, or random access memory. RAM is similar to the 
short term memory in the brain; it  is quickly accessible and is constantly being 
referred to. In order for a computer to continually process more than one task at 
a time, it  must offload the tasks to its memory in order to address the additional 
tasks. Without this ability to offload information, the computer becomes slow 
and almost unusable. This process sounds surprisingly similar to the process of 
the human mind in that our ability to process multiple tasks at the level we do is 
only possible by our ability to offload our mind; to extend our mind into our 
environment.  
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Merlin Donald, whose theory deals with the evolution of the human mind, 
argues that the cognitive evolution of humans last took place nearly 40,000 
years ago. This evolution was sparked by the first use of “[…] visuographic 
representations in the form of body decorations, grave decoration, and object 
arrangement […]”17 which acted as a type of memory store. This new way of 
storing information began to constitute a new cognitive form of thinking. With 
this leap in cognition, Donald argues that the australopithecines18 made a great 
stride towards becoming the Homo Sapiens  of today. It  begins to depend on how 
one views the argument of the extended mind. If someone, such as Clark and 
Chalmers, perceive the use of tools or something as simple as an exogram on a 
cave wall as the ability to extend one’s mind, then what we acknowledge as part 
of the extended mind has simply become second nature to our everyday 
experiences. That is,  perhaps opponents to the extended mind case are living in 
denial of the fact that humans have been extending their minds as far back as the 
beginning of human history and it  does not necessarily line up with their view 
of the extended mind.   
Additionally, a possible objection to the extended mind deals with the 
problem of sharing minds. If we imagine the case with Otto’s notebook, we can 
see that Otto’s memories are vulnerable to being shared with others. Does the 
issue of sharing minds pose a threat to the conditions of the extended mind? I 
claim that sharing of the mind is not an unusual aspect and therefore does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Donald, Merlin. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991. 273-274. Print. 
 
18 A bipedal hominid existing nearly 4 million years ago which is now extinct, but carried ancestral links to Homo 
Sapiens. 
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alter the conditions for the extended mind. People are sharing their minds all the 
time. They do this whenever they talk with one another. A conversation is a 
sharing of words and words are formed in the mind, therefore a conversation is 
the interaction between minds. This conversation type of sharing the mind is no 
different from that of Google Maps or even the internet.  The internet is simply a 
large conversation between computers. Although there exists a concern with 
privacy of two or more people that literally share a mind, the privacy involved 
in the conversation type of sharing the mind is dealt with by simply filtering 
what you say. The same thing can be said for computers and the internet.  That 
is,  Otto has the option to share his memories with others by simply lending them 
his notebook or to withhold his memories by safeguarding the notebook. 
Although Otto is more vulnerable in that his memories can be “stolen”, it  does 
not affect the case of the extended mind. That is,  i t  does not make it  that his 
notebook is not part of his mind since it  is vulnerable to theft.  It  would be 
equivalent to saying that someone’s memory is not part of their mind since it  is 
possible one may experience brief amnesia.  Ultimately, the idea of a massive 
sharing of the mind does not inhibit the conditions for the extended mind.  
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CONCLUSION – WHAT’S NEXT? 
 
I . IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXTENDED MIND 
Understanding and analyzing the extended mind gives us a perspective on 
how we are able to manipulate our environment in order to incorporate our 
minds. By referring to several of the examples which I mentioned above, we can 
see that there exists a relationship between how our mind interacts with our 
environment. The “closeness” of this interaction is based on the adaptability of 
the mind. As our tools become more and more sophisticated, there is a trend 
which is slowly closing the gap between the amount of conditioning needed to 
adapt to certain ways of extending the mind. For instance, the car has evolved 
from the “manual” clutch to an “automatic” clutch which gives the user less 
responsibility when dealing with the process of driving a car. This offloading of 
responsibilities shows how we are able to maximize our productivity so we have 
no problem keeping one hand on the steering wheel and the other on a sandwich. 
However, it  is interesting to investigate the adaptability of the mind since less 
and less of it  is needed as more and more of our technology takes advantage of 
the ability to extend our mind. This trend appears to be working its way up to 
reach a sort of autonomy in our tools where we will only slightly have to 
acquaint ourselves with the user interface of the object in order to fully benefit 
from it.   
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Perhaps when we reach the level of artificial intelligence, we will once 
and for all  be able to come to a conclusion about the ability of our minds to 
extend out into the world. That is,  a robot with human intelligence has an 
advantage over humans in that it  will  be able to communicate directly with 
computers and components while we as humans only have an intermediary 
mouse and keyboard in most cases to communicate with a computer. The robot 
with human intelligence will be able to extend its mind into the world through 
the use of the internet and networks. Perhaps what we will learn from the robot 
with human intelligence is that we are far less effective at extending our mind 
than the robot, but if we find that it  is possible with the robot to extend the 
mind, we are given a new field of research to investigate in order to be able to 
fully extend our minds into the world. So, we can see that as the advancements 
in technology come about, our ability to extend our minds starts to become more 
and more second nature.  
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